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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

SUMMARY

STEVENS v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS:

WORKER'S COMPENSATION-WHEN DOES
A TOTAL DISABILITY BECOME PARTIAL?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs,l the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's disability
that was total does not become partial for purposes of compensation until suitable alternative employment is available to the
employee. 2 Interpreting the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA),3 the court answered an issue not
previously decided: when does a total disability become partial?"

1. Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 909 F.2d 1256
(9th Cir. 1990) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Ferguson, J., and Pregerson, J. concurring), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1991) (No. 90-515).
2. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1257 (reversing and remanding a decision of the Benefits
Review Board).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1990).
4. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. The court's interpretation of the Act rejected the Benefit Review Board's retroactive application of an employee's change of disability status
(total to partial) to the date of maximum medical improvement. Id. at 1257. Maximum
medical improvement is reached when the injury has healed to the fullest extent possible. Id.

239

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 13

240

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:239

II. BACKGROUND

A.

FACTS

In May of 1981, petitioner Wilborn Stevens, a Lockheed
employee, injured his right arm in a work related accident:! He
received medical treatment, including two surgeries, and attained maximum medical improvement on November 29, 1982.6
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that Stevens had lost
20 percent of the use in his right arm. 7 Lockheed paid Stevens
temporary total disability from the date of injury until February
6, 1983. 8 After this date, Lockheed began to pay permanent partial disability compensation for a 20 percent loss of use of a
right arm.9
At a December 1985 hearing on Stevens' claim for compensation before the ALJ, it was concluded that Stevens had a
residual earning capacity.lO A vocational specialist established
that Stevens could perform a job in a convenience food store or
a self-service gas station as of September 30, 1985. 11 Lockheed
did not contend that it had proven these jobs were available to
Stevens at any earlier date. 12
The ALJ awarded Stevens the following compensation: a)
temporary total disability, from May 1981 to November 29,
1982; b) permanent total disability, from November 30, 1982 to
September 29, 1985 (after which date jobs were found to be
available); and c) permanent partial disability, from September
30, 1985 until benefits ended by schedule. IS Lockheed appealed
to the Benefits Review Board the ALJ's award of permanent to5. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1257.
6. [d.
7. [d. at 1257-58.
8. [d. at 1258.

9. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1258 (emphasis in original).
10. [d.
U. [d.
12. [d.

13. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1258. Permanent total disability pays 66 % % of the
worker's average weekly wage for the duration of the disability. 33 U.S.C. § 908(a)
(1990). Temporary total disability pays 66 2/3 % of the average weekly wages during the
duration of the disability. 33 U.S.C. § 908(b). Permanent partial disability pays 66 % %
of the average weekly wage for a length of time determined by schedule. 33 U.S.C. §
908(c) (emphasis added).
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tal disability from November 30, 1982 to September 29, 1985. H
On appeal, the Benefits Review Board vacated and reversed
the ALJ's award of permanent total disability between November 1982 and September 1985. Iii The Board found Stevens was
only entitled to permanent partial disability benefits for that
period. I8 In so doing, the Board retroactively applied the showing of alternative available jobs to the date of maximum medical
improvement. 17

B.

THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT

The LHWCA establishes disability coverage for four different categories: permanent total, temporary total, permanent partial and temporary partial disability.I8 The Act defines "disability" as incapacity due to injury to earn the wages which the
employee was earning at the time of injury in the same or any
other job. I9
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit noted that an injured worker has the
burden of showing the injury was work related and that it prevents performance of his prior job. 20 Upon such a showing, the
employer has the burden of proving that suitable alternative
work is available in. the community.21 If the employer fails to
meet this burden, the ALJ will hold that the disability is total
and, probably, permanent. 22 The employer must identify specific
14. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258.
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis in original).
17. Id.
18. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. See 33 U.S.C. § 908 (a)-(c), (e) (1990) and supra note

13.
19. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) (1990) which provides: .. 'Disability' means incapacity
because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury in the same or any other employment.... "
20. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 849 F.2d 1194
(9th Cir. 1988) (upheld ALJ's finding that employer failed to meet its burden of demonstrating alternative work was available to claimant, who was employed as a rigger before
injury).
21. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. See Hairston, 849 F.2d at 1196.
22. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 13

242

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:239

jobs that the claimant is capable of performing.23
In determining when a total disability becomes partial, the
Ninth Circuit looked to the statutory language and policy concerns encompassed by the LHWCA.24 The court observed that
the statute indicates two independent variables of disability: nature (or duration) of disability and degree of disability.211 The
statute's four disability categories use the words "temporary"
and "permanent" to denote the duration (nature) of the disability; "total" and "partial" go to the severity (degree) of disability.26 The court concluded that maximum medical improvement
is indicative of permanent/temporary disability and availability
of alternative work is indicative of partial/total disability.27 As a
result, the court reasoned that the statute's structuring of the
term "disability" supports a change from total disability status
to partial disability at the date of available suitable alternative
employment. 28
The Ninth Circuit noted that the statutory definition of
"disability" contains a wage-earning component.29 The degree of
physical disability is measured by its impact on the employee's
earning capacity.30 The court thus reasoned that a claimant is
only able to work when there is a suitable job available that he is
capable of performing. 31 In assessing an employee's capability to
perform possible work, the Benefits Review Board must consider
the claimant's skills along with the likelihood given the claimant's education, age and background, that he would be hired if
he diligently pursued the potential job. 32
23. [d. See Bumble Bee Seafoods v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 629 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirmed Benefit Review Board's granting of
benefits for total disability to claimant where employer did not show specific jobs available that injured claimant could perform).
24. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259.
25. [d.
26. [d. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259.
28. [d.
29. [d. at 1259. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) (1990) and supra note 19 for statutory
language.
30. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259. See Bumble Bee, 629 F.2d at 1328.
31. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259.
32. [d. at 1258. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 849 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir.
1988).
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The Benefits Review Board maintained that an employee's
capability to perform a given task neither increases nor decreases between the time he reached maximum medical improvement and a later showing of an available job. 33 The Ninth
Circuit observed, however, that in holding that a disability
changes from total to partial at the same time it changes from
temporary to permanent, the Board ignored the economic aspect
- the degree of disability.34 The court also noted that the Board
assumed that the job market at .the time of maximum medical
improvement was the same as when the job showing was made. 311
Since this point was not proven, the court reasoned that an alternative job within the claimant's abilities may not have appeared until sometime after maximum medical improvement
was attained, or the claimant may have required training and
education after maximum medical improvement to obtain a suitable job. 36 Since courts have no way of knowing the actual circumstances, the fact on which a change in disability status will
turn must be proof of an actual job which the claimant is able to
perform and can realistically obtain if diligently sought. 37
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit noted that its interpretation of the
LHWCA best serves the statute's policy interest in encouraging
injured workers back into the work force by providing employers
with an incentive to inform workers promptly of available jobs. 36
Creating that incentive enables claimants to discover potential
employment that they might otherwise not know of, even though
the employer is not obligated to find a claimant a job. 39
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs,40 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act41 to support that an em33. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259.
34. Id. at 1259-60.
35. Id. at 1260.
36. Id.
37. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1260.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 909 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990).
41. See supra note 3.
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ployee's disability status changes from total to partial only upon
the date of available alternative employment. 42
The court noted that the statute's definition of "disability"
equated physical impairment with incapacity to earn pre-injury
wages. 43 Hence, an employee is only able to work once a suitable
job becomes available which he is then capable of performing.44
The Ninth Circuit concluded that this interpretation best serves
the statute's policy interests of rehabilitating injured workers to
re-enter the work force by giving employers an incentive to show
promptly the availability of jobs to employees. 4!!
In holding that a claimant's total disability status changes
to partial once suitable alternative work is available, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Benefit Review Board's holding that the
change from total to partial disability status is retroactive to the
date of maximum medical improvement. 46 The court asserted
that the Board's retroactive application of disability status
change to the time of maximum medical improvement focuses
on the medical aspect, but ignores the economic component of
disability.47 Because a new job within the injured worker's abilities may not have been available until after maximum medical
improvement, total disability does not become partial until the
employer meets its burden of showing available alternative employment that the claimant can perform and probably obtain if
diligently sought. 48
Carol A. Farmer*

42. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259.
43.Id.
44.Id.
45. Id. at 1260.
46. Id. at 1257.
47. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259-60.
48. Id. at 1260.
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